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Abstract 
Tax credits are a popular way to alleviate in-work poverty. A common empirical assumption 
is that the benefit of the tax credit is borne solely by the claimant workers. However, 
economic theory suggests no particular reason why this should be the case. This paper 
investigates the impact of the Working Families’ Tax Credit, introduced in the UK in 1999, 
on wages. Unlike similar tax credit policies, this tax credit was paid through employers rather 
than directly to workers, making it more salient to the employer. Using a novel identification 
strategy, we can separately identify the effect on wages associated with an increase in the 
amount of tax credit and that associated with the change in salience. We find evidence that: 
(1) through the salience mechanism the firm cuts the wage of claimant workers relative to 
similarly skilled non-claimants by 30 percent of the tax credit, which is approximately 7 
percent of the wage, and (2) there is a negative spillover effect onto the wages of claimant 
and non-claimant workers of 1.7 percent, which is approximately 8 percent of the tax credit 
for claimant workers. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
Traditional welfare policy often struggles to provide support for low-income families 
without creating distortions in the labor market. The introduction of the Working Families’ 
Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK in October 1999, which replaced Family Credit, sought to 
help working families. WFTC aimed to alleviate poverty at the lower end of the wage 
distribution, reduce income inequality, and redistribute income by reducing the dispersion of 
earnings. Unlike similar tax credit policies in different countries, such as the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States and the Self-Sufficiency Program in Canada, the 
WFTC was paid through employers rather than directly to workers. The motivation for 
payment through the wage packet was to make the tax credit more convenient to distribute 
and to reduce the stigma attached to receiving tax credits in the form of a welfare benefit, 
which could also then increase its take-up rate. However, payment in this way gave 
employers complete information about which employees were claiming and how much 
WFTC they were receiving, thus making it more salient to the employers. 
The policy change in the UK from Family Credit to WFTC had two important 
components. First, the amount of the tax credit was increased. Second, the tax credit was paid 
through employers rather than directly to workers. It is typically assumed that the incidence 
of the tax credit is solely on the claimant worker. That is, it is assumed that the worker 
receives the full tax credit; however, this is unlikely to be the case—it is more likely that the 
employers share in the gains from the tax credit. It can be shown with a simple general 
equilibrium model that the eligible employee and the employer can share the incidence of the 
increased tax credit and that a spillover effect onto non-eligible workers can occur. Moreover, 
the increased visibility of the tax credit can be exploited to identify a channel through which 
the incidence of the tax credit can be shared, even in the absence of a change in the amount 
of tax credit paid. 
In this paper, we propose an approach to estimate the direct effect of the tax credit on 
the wage of eligible workers, as well as the indirect (i.e., spillover) effect on similarly skilled 
non-eligible workers. We separately identify the effect on wages associated an increase in 
the amount of tax credit and the effect associated with a change in salience. Interestingly, we 
find that while the change in the amount of tax credit received by families has virtually no 
effect on wages, the increased visibility has a strong effect on wages, such that there is a shift 
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in the incidence of the tax credit through the salience mechanism. We find, first, that the 
employer cuts the wage of the eligible (male) worker relative to a similarly skilled non-
eligible worker, allowing the employer to extract 38 percent of the WFTC gains – 30 percent 
directly and 8 percent via a “spillover”. Second, we find that there is a negative spillover 
effect of WFTC onto the wages of comparable workers, resulting in as much as 1.7 percent 
decrease. 
Traditionally, the literature has focused on the financial incentives for the recipient 
created by taxes and subsidies. Leigh (2009) and Rothstein (2010) investigate the impact of 
increased labor supply resulting from changes in the EITC in the US on the equilibrium wage. 
Using variation across states in EITC supplements, Leigh (2009) finds that a 10 percent 
increase in the generosity of EITC is associated with a 4 percent decrease in the wages of 
high school dropouts and a 2 percent decrease in the wages of college graduates. Rothstein 
(2010) uses variation across the wage distribution in the implementations of the mid-1990s 
federal EITC expansion and finds that low-skilled mothers kept only 70 percent of every 
dollar they received under the EITC. Unlike the EITC, an interesting feature of the WFTC in 
the UK is the payment through employers rather than directly to workers, which allows the 
employer to have information on the amount of subsidy received. In the US, the employer is 
not responsible for income-tax filing on behalf of employees, so the EITC is not visible to 
the employer.  
Recent research has highlighted that the salience and transparency of tax incidence 
may matter as much as, if not more than, the financial incentives alone. For example, in an 
experiment to test whether people under-react to sales taxes, Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) 
show that by posting price tags with the tax-inclusive price below the original pretax price 
tag, demand decreases by 8 percent. Finkelstein (2009) analyzes how tolls change after toll 
facilities adopt electronic collection, such that drivers are less aware of tolls. She finds that 
tolls are as much as 40 percent higher than they would have been without the electronic 
method. With regard to tax credit salience, a recent experiment by Chetty and Saez (2013) 
shows that when providing recipients with information about the work incentives of the 
EITC, there was a significant effect on earnings. In another (field) experiment on the EITC, 
Jones (2010) finds that reducing informational costs regarding Advance EITC, which allows 
EITC recipients to receive a portion of the credit early—in incremental payments in each 
4 
 
paycheck during the tax year instead of in a one-time EITC payment—does little to increase 
participation in the program. While most of the salience literature focuses on the recipient, 
in this paper, the distinctive nature of this policy allows us to focus on the change in salience 
from the employer’s perspective. Tax credits existed in the UK before WFTC, but they were 
paid, like the EITC, directly to the recipient. The change in payment method allows us to 
investigate the impact on employers’ behavior. 
The empirical strategy in this paper uses the eligibility criteria based on multiple 
household characteristics to create an accurate comparison group. A counterfactual wage for 
each worker is constructed using a rich set of worker characteristics prior to implementation 
of the WFTC. We adjust for changes in common trends, such as changes in the average 
earnings and general inflation, to measure the direct effect of WFTC on eligible workers and 
the spillover effect on all workers (eligible and non-eligible) as the deviations from their 
effective wages with respect to their predicted wage. To estimate the indirect effect of WFTC 
on all similar workers, we measure the change in wages for workers in different education 
(industry) groups, where we weight each group by the average amount of WFTC that workers 
in those groups are eligible for and the fraction of eligible employees. In addition, we use the 
change in generosity from the previous policy, Family Credit, to understand the mechanism 
behind sharing the tax credit incidence. Family Credit differed from WFTC in terms of 
generosity and the method through which is was paid, however, it was similar to WFTC in 
terms of the eligibility criteria, such as being contingent on working a certain number of 
hours and on the presence of children.  
Our analysis of the effects of the tax credit considers both, men and women. 
Traditionally, the tax credit literature focused mostly on women, and in particular, single 
women (see, for instance, Eissa and Leibman, 1996 for the US and Blundell et al., 2000; 
Francesconi and van der Klauuw, 2007 for the UK). However, institutional structure of 
WFTC specified that either parent could claim the tax credit through his or her employer. 
Given that fathers were as likely as mothers (if not more likely) to claim the tax credit through 
their employer, it is relevant for us to include men in the analysis. In addition, the policy’s 
labor supply impact has been shown to be different for men and women. While the policy 
resulted in a labor supply increase only for single mothers, with no overall effect on married 
mothers (but it may increase or decrease depending on partners’ employment status), there 
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was a small and negligible negative effect on the labor supply of fathers (for studies on labor 
supply effects on single parents, see Blundell et al., 2000; Gregg and Harkness, 2003; Brewer 
et al., 2006; Francesconi and van der Klauuw, 2007; Leigh, 2007; Gregg, Harkness, Smith, 
2009; Azmat, 2014; Shephard, 2017). For studies on married couples, see Blundell et al., 
2000; Blundell, 2001; Blundell and Hoynes, 2004; Francesconi, Rainer, van der Klaaw, 
2009; Shephard, 2017). In the analysis, we look separately by marital status of men and 
women. Finally, Azmat (2014) shows that there are no significant effects of the policy on the 
inactivity-activity margin for women and only very modest effects on the employment-
unemployment margin. 
The results in the paper have important policy implications. In particular, they imply 
that there is a significant shift in the burden of tax credits and that it is the salience of the tax 
credit—not the change in its amount—that is important for this shift in incidence. This is of 
critical policy importance, as we can no longer assume that the effects of the tax credit are 
concentrated on the beneficiary. Moreover, the method by which tax credits are distributed 
will have important consequences. These results are central to our understanding of the 
consequences of the expansion, application and generosity of tax credits.  
 
Section 2: Analytical and Institutional Framework 
In this section, we discuss how in a simple market economy, with and without worker 
heterogeneity, and in an imperfect competition economy there are likely to be shifts in the 
burden of the tax credit away from the eligible employee. Moreover, the salience of the tax 
credit is likely to play an important role. There are two important findings from both settings 
that can be empirically tested: first, there is a direct effect on the wages of those eligible; 
second, there is an indirect effect on eligible and non-eligible workers. 
 
2.1. Analytical Framework 
Typically, discussions of tax credits presume that the incidence of the tax credit is 
entirely on workers. However, this is unlikely to be the case. When studying the economics 
of taxation for goods, a basic result is that the economic incidence of the tax is not necessarily 
the same as the statutory incidence. In particular, the economic incidence will depend on the 
elasticities of supply and demand for the good being taxed. We might expect this to be the 
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case for tax credits as well. To model some degree of partial incidence of the tax credit on 
wages it would be necessary that both, eligible workers and employers, have some degree of 
bargaining power over wages. Moreover, since tax credit recipients typically compete in the 
same labor market as others who are not eligible for the tax credit, we might observe 
spillovers on non-eligible workers. This would be the case if there is some degree of 
substitutability between eligible and non-eligible workers. There are a number of models that 
incorporate these features and help us understand the empirical setting and the results.1  
Even in a simple economy setting, assuming that workers are perfect substitutes and 
the law of one wage holds, if we extend the simple tax incidence model and allow for some 
workers to be eligible for a tax credit and others not, we would expect that the tax credit, as 
is the case for taxes, would create a distortion. Computing the equilibrium labor demand and 
supply, we would expect that a change in tax credit will affect wages. In particular, depending 
on the proportion of eligible workers, the larger the labor supply elasticity of the eligible 
group and the more elastic the labor demand, the larger the shift in the subsidy from the 
worker to the employer. In equilibrium, firms would be indifferent between hiring an eligible 
and an ineligible worker, such that the direct incidence effect and the spillover effects would 
be the same for eligible and non-eligible workers. Empirically, the presence of bargaining or 
other frictions may entail that a firm treats an eligible or a non-eligible worker differently. 
We discuss this in more detail later in the section.  
Harberger’s (1962) general equilibrium analysis derives the burden of a tax on capital 
in one sector. Azmat (2012) adapts the Harberger model to show the general equilibrium 
effect of a tax credit on input compensation in a one-sector model that uses two different 
types of labor to produce one good. More specifically, extending the simple model described 
above to allow for worker heterogeneity, where heterogeneity is based on eligibility criteria, 
it is shown that there exist wage effects of a tax credit on both the eligible and non-eligible 
groups. Namely, a direct effect of a change in the tax credit on the wages of eligible workers, 
which, as in the simple case, would be a result of bargaining between employer and worker 
in the incidence of the tax credit. In addition, there exists an indirect (spillover) effect on the 
wages of non-eligible workers, where the magnitude of the wage effect on this group, relative 
                                                 
1 For a formal discussion of the different models, see an earlier version of the paper (Azmat, 2012) 
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to the eligible group, depends on the level of substitutability between the two groups as well 
as the proportion of the groups.  
While the direct effect is the result of the individual bargaining between the firm and 
the worker, the indirect effects are equilibrium effects and do not rely on any specific form 
of wage-setting and could be the result of a wage-posting model. For example, incorporating 
some of the above features, Shephard (2017) uses a wage-posting search model with frictions 
(á la Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) to show that if firms set wages and if eligible workers 
respond the reform by increasing labor supply, firms may respond by lowering wage offers. 
In which case, the effective transfer to eligible families is reduced, whilst non-eligible 
families may become worse off if they are competing within the same labor market. Even in 
a partial equilibrium monopsony, following Manning (2003), it can be shown that the gross 
wage of a tax-credit claimant will fall, and in the general equilibrium setting, a revenue-
neutral increase in tax progressivity reduces the average wage the employer pays. 
The visibility of the tax credit is likely to play an important role in the shift in tax 
credit incidence. If the employer has some information/knowledge about which of her 
workers is eligible for the tax credit and there is some degree of individual wage bargaining 
between the firm and each given worker, wages can react to the tax credit that the employer 
infers and that the worker receives. If the tax credit is paid through the employer, the 
employer can see clearly if the worker is claiming (and how much she is receiving) rather 
than inferring it when it is paid by the state.2 These bargaining effects may be the results of 
a rational response or of a behavioral response on the side of the employer or employee. 
On the employer side, the employer may internalize that an eligible worker is 
unambiguously better off as a result of the tax credit. If we assume market frictions, we might 
expect that the employer will realize that if she cuts the worker’s gross wage, the worker will 
not quit immediately. In turn, the employer can absorb part of the benefits of the tax credit 
by paying lower wages. In this case, we would expect two potential effects: first, the 
employer can cut the wage of the eligible worker, and/or second, she can average out the 
                                                 
2 In the absence of direct visibility of the tax credit, the employer needs to rely on some form of statistical 
discrimination by inferring the likelihood of the worker claiming the tax credit. 
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effect for all workers.3 The second, indirect, effect is more relevant when workers within the 
same firm have very similar roles – for example, as the size of the firm increases, it is more 
common to have workers with the same job title. In Section 7, we show that there are 
differences depending on the size of the firm. Note that, while the visibility effect requires 
some degree of individual wage bargaining, the effects of tax generosity and the spillover 
effects can operate through direct wage posting. 
In the absence of an employer making optimization errors when setting the wages of 
eligible and non-eligible workers, there may be other rational or behavioral responses that 
could explain a shift in tax credit incidence. For example, in terms of a behavioral response, 
while an employer may not find it fair to “steal” a subsidy the government is paying directly 
to the worker as a welfare payment, the employer may find it fair to “share” a subsidy the 
government is paying to the firm to help the firm pay the employee. In this case, the method 
of payment might make a difference in their response. However, there are still potential 
rational responses that might be a consequence of asymmetric information. If, for example, 
the employer approximately knows that the worker receives the tax credit but there is an 
asymmetric response on the side of workers (e.g., he or she would leave the firm if 
underpaid), then the cost of undershooting or overshooting with the incidence is also 
asymmetric. We might, therefore, expect employers to take a cautious approach before 
reducing wages. The noisier the signal is, the more cautious the approach of firms. By 
knowing exactly who receives the tax credit and the exact amount, we would expect the 
incidence effect to increase.  
On the worker side, there may also be behavioral effects that would imply an effect 
of tax credits on wages. The most obvious response would that that the worker adapts labor 
supply.4 However, there are other channels through which the worker might respond, even 
in the absence of a labor supply response. For instance, workers may perceive that their wages 
are higher if they are “topped up” with tax credits rather than receiving tax credits as a 
separate payment and this perception may induce them to accept a lower wage. With this in 
                                                 
3 It is reasonable to assume that the employer cannot substitute eligible for non-eligible workers because, 
given that the eligibility criteria are not “physically” apparent at the interview stage (only after they have been 
employed), the employer cannot prescreen workers and discriminate. 
4 Empirically, the studies have found only small effects of WFTC on labor supply. See Brewer and Browne, 
2006 and Brewer et al. 2009 for a review of studies and see page 20 for a detailed discussion of the literature. 
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mind, there may potentially be a number of behavioral effects. For example, there may be 
reference points for what the worker considers an acceptable wage. When the tax credit is 
paid through the employer rather than directly to workers, workers might be willing to accept 
lower payments from the firm because the overall paycheck goes beyond those reference 
points. Moreover, if workers are behavioral, rational firms would react to this and would try 
to exploit these biases. 
In summary, we have discussed how in various settings a tax credit has consequences 
for the wages of both eligible and non-eligible workers. This is the case even in a simple 
competitive framework, and we see that the effects persist even in a more realistic non-
competitive framework. Overall, we may expect that the tax credit will have a negative effect 
on the wages of both eligible and non-eligible employees. In the subsequent sections, we will 
empirically investigate the effect of tax credits on wages. 
 
2.2. Institutional Framework 
The Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), introduced in the UK in October 1999, 
was designed to target low-income families with an income supplement that was contingent 
on being employed. Although in-work cash benefits existed in the UK prior to 1999, WFTC 
was more generous and extended further up the income distribution. Compared with its 
predecessor, Family Credit, twice as many families became eligible under WFTC. Figure 1 
show how the number of claimants changed from 1988 to 2002.5 From 1.1 million claims for 
WFTC in August 2000, the number increased to 1.3 million in August 2001, nearly 430,000 
more than claimed under Family Credit in August 1999.  
The eligibility for WFTC and the amount received were based on four factors: family 
income being less than £92.90 per week; the presence of children in the household; a 
minimum of 16 hours of work in the family per week; and low household savings. If 
household income was above £92.90 per week, the maximum WFTC was reduced. In 
particular, the marginal deduction rate was 55 percent. That is, there was a reduction of £0.55 
for each pound over £92.90. The maximum weekly rate of WFTC consisted of a credit for 
each child and a bonus if the claimant or his/her partner worked for 30 hours or more each 
week.  
                                                 
5 In April 2003, WFTC changed again to the Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit. 
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The government spent £5 billion per year on WFTC (which accounted for 1.5 percent 
of the government budget and 0.6 percent of the GDP in 2000). This was nearly £2 billion 
more than was spent under Family Credit. The increase in expenditure came from the 
increased credit per child (for example, for children under 11 years old, it increased from 
£15.15 to £26.00); the threshold support increase from £80.65 per week to £92.90 per week; 
and there was a decrease in the marginal deduction rates from 70 percent to 55 percent, as 
described above.6 In addition, the childcare cost changed from paying £60 (£100) for one 
child’s (more than one child’s) weekly childcare to paying 70 percent of childcare costs that 
account for weekly childcare costs up to a maximum of £135 for one child and £200 for two 
or more children. The policy parameters for the different years are shown in appendix Table 
A.1. 
The changes with respect to Family Credit implied that those who were previously 
receiving the maximum payment would see a small increase if they had children under the 
age of eleven; those with a income between £80.65 and £92.90 per week would receive full 
tax credit support. Others would benefit from the decrease in the marginal deduction rate 
from 70 percent to 55 percent, and the largest cash gain would go to those who were 
previously just outside the eligibility bands. Figures A.1 to A.3 show the change in budget 
constraint from Family Credit to WFTC for different family types.  
It is important to note, however, that the change in generosity of tax credits did not 
necessarily correspond to changes in income because of its interaction with other taxes and 
benefits. For example, the increase in income (for single mothers) was small for those who 
worked fewer than 25 hours a week because of the interaction between WFTC and the 
Housing Benefit (Blundell and Walker, 2001). Shephard (2017) develops an equilibrium job 
search model and takes an integrated view of the UK tax system to study the effects of WFTC. 
The analysis shows that non-WFTC reforms, such as changes in income tax over the same 
period, which affected all workers, had only a very small effect on the labor supply, which is 
mostly concentrated on single parents. In the analysis, we look at the effect of WFTC 
separately for different subgroups. Another possible interaction is between WFTC and the 
national minimum wage, introduced in 1999. In the analysis, however, it imposes a lower 
                                                 
6 These are based on the final Family Credit parameters in 1999 and the 2001 WFTC parameters. For all 
policy parameters, see Table A.1. 
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bound below which the employer cannot cut the gross wage.  We use the minimum wage as 
a point of censor when measuring the policy effectiveness.  
The key characteristic for estimating the policy change was that the policy became 
salient to the employer. Moreover, unlike other transfers, WFTC became salient to the 
employer. As mentioned previously, the main difference between Family Credit and WFTC 
was that the WFTC payment was made through the employer rather than directly to the 
worker. This method appealed to the government because the payments became more 
convenient to distribute, and it reduced the “welfare benefit” stigma attached to the tax credit. 
From October 1999, the eligible claimant would apply for the tax credit from the Inland 
Revenue, which would work out the amount of tax credit payable.7 The Inland Revenue 
would then notify the relevant employer of the amount of tax credit to be paid, and the 
employer would pay it out of the tax and National Insurance contribution that she would 
otherwise have forwarded to the Inland Revenue. This increased the visibility of the tax credit 
from the viewpoint of the employer. 
 
Section 3: Data 
The empirical investigation is performed using the UK's Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). The LFS is a quarterly representative survey of households that contains 
detailed information on individuals, households and families. This includes information on 
employment, earnings and a variety of control variables needed for our analysis. In our 
analysis, we mostly use data from 1997 to 2003. Although data are available beyond this 
period, we do not use them because the Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit replaced 
WFTC in April 2003. 
The sample includes men and women aged 21 to 60. Full-time students, the 
sick/disabled and individuals in a government training program are omitted from the sample. 
In addition, to remove outliers, observations of gross hourly wages below £2 and above £60 
are excluded, which excludes approximately 1.4 percent of the sample over the whole period. 
The hourly wage variable is corrected in two ways. To adjust for changes in common trends, 
we correct our wage variable quarterly for the changes in average earnings and general 
                                                 
7 WFTC started in October 1999, although Family Credit recipients stayed on Family Credit until their 6-
month reward ran out. 
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inflation using quarterly average earning indexes (AEI) and the retail price index (RPI) from 
the UK’s Office of National Statistics.  
The LFS contains information on benefit receipts, so we can identify those who are 
eligible for WFTC and those who say they claim it. We can also estimate the amount of 
benefit for which a household is eligible using data on household income, hours worked, and 
the presence of children (i.e., the eligibility criteria), all of which are included in the dataset. 
In addition, we can calculate – based on these characteristics – the difference in tax credit 
entitlement compared with Family Credit, the preexisting tax credit.  
 
Section 4: Identification Strategy 
In this section, we describe the strategy we use to identify the effect of WFTC on 
wages. In particular, we want to estimate the direct effect of WFTC on eligible workers and 
the indirect (i.e., spillover) effect on all similar workers. In addition, we want to separately 
identify the effect on wages that comes from a change in salience versus a change in 
generosity. We do this in two stages. First, we estimate a counterfactual wage, which is a 
prediction of the wage a worker would receive in the absence of WFTC. Second, we 
separately measure the direct effect of WFTC on eligible workers and the indirect effect on 
all workers. 
We start by estimating a wage equation using data from the period preceding the 
introduction of WFTC. This is then used to predict future wages (i.e., to construct the 
counterfactual wage of those eligible for WFTC). This is described in detail in Section 5.1. 
Since the standard difference-in-difference approach is not feasible for estimating spillover 
effects, we employ a strategy that will allow us to estimate the direct, as well as indirect, 
policy effects.  
In the policy evaluation literature, it is common to construct “treatment” and “control” 
groups from whose comparison we can measure policy effectiveness. In particular, the 
literature on tax credit policy evaluation compares people with children (i.e., “treatment” 
group) to those without (i.e., “control” group) and, quite commonly, single mothers with 
single women without children (see, for instance, Eissa and Leibman, 1996; Francesconi and 
van der Klauuw, 2007; Gregg and Harkness, 2003; Azmat, 2014). Here, we use an alternative 
identification strategy. Since WFTC eligibility is multidimensional, we identify as “treated” 
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the group that fulfills the eligibility criteria. Moreover, rather than using a simple treatment 
identifier, we construct a more flexible variable that allows for variation in the amount of 
WFTC for which a worker is eligible. 
The eligibility for WFTC is based on the presence and number of children, household 
income, and hours of work in the household. The differences in the factors determine not 
only whether a household is eligible but also the size of their entitlement (i.e., how much the 
household is eligible for). If both members of the household are working, only one worker 
in the household can claim the WFTC through his or her employer. 
The workers’ counterfactual wage is constructed using their estimated pre-WFTC 
wage. Based on their characteristics, two workers can have the same predicted wage, but one 
may be eligible for WFTC when it is introduced while the other is not. We later show that 
eligible workers are similar in observable characteristics to non-eligible workers with the 
same predicted wage. Note that the “frontier” between eligible and non-eligible includes 
multiple dimensions and is a continuous treatment. This is richer than using the children 
criterion alone. 
To estimate the direct effect of WFTC on eligible workers, we compare the wages of 
eligible and non-eligible workers with the same predicted wage once WFTC is introduced. 
The predicted wage is corrected for average earning changes and general inflation using 
quarterly indexes from the UK's Office of National Statistics. Since we have quarterly data, 
we can look at wages in the narrow periods before and after the introduction of WFTC. We 
can then compare the relative wages before and after wage changes. Of course, a key 
consideration is that workers do not alter their behavior to become eligible if they were not 
previously. In particular, we find that they do not change their hours worked.8 We address 
this further in Section 5. 
Using information on the previous program, Family Credit, we can identify whether 
the effect is driven by a change in generosity or a change in visibility. We do this by 
estimating the change in generosity from Family Credit (the last levels when in operation) 
and WFTC. As a robustness check in Section 7, we conduct a “falsification” test by repeating 
this analysis on placebo treatments in years prior to the 1999 change to ensure that this 
                                                 
8 We are not concerned by the presence of children because, at least in the short run, this will not be altered. In 
addition, we use predicted weekly wages to calculate household income (this will become clear in the next 
section). 
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relative difference was not there before the WFTC reform, when the tax credit was not salient 
to the employer. This also reassures us that the common trend assumption we impose holds 
on a sample outside our treatment period. 
To estimate the indirect effect of WFTC on all similar workers, we categorize all 
workers into education and industry groups separately and identify the fraction of WFTC-
eligible workers in each group. This is described in detail in Section 5.1. We test whether an 
increase in the presence of eligible workers in a group leads to a change in the wage of all 
workers in that group.  
Another important feature of our analysis is that we study the wage changes for both 
male and female workers. The institutional structure of WFTC specifies that either parent 
can claim the tax credit through his or her employer. Although, we cannot identify whom in 
the household claims – we calculate incidence for the respondent of the survey – the 
calculations are a lower bound for the actual incidence of the claimant. Given that in a 
coupled household, it is more likely that the male member of the household will work, and it 
is, therefore, more likely that he will be the tax credit claimant. There are other important 
reasons to study workers separately by gender, as well as marital status. While the policy 
resulted in small labor supply increases for single mother, there was no overall effect on 
married mothers and a small and negligible negative effect on the labor supply of fathers (see 
Blundell et al., 2000; Gregg and Harkness, 2003; Brewer et al., 2006; Francesconi and van 
der Klauuw, 2007; Leigh, 2007; Gregg, Harkness, Smith, 2009; Azmat, 2014; Francesconi, 
Rainer, van der Klaaw, 2009; Shephard, 2017).  
 
Section 5: Estimation Strategy 
In the previous section, we described the main features of the empirical analysis. We 
now proceed to the estimation strategy. We begin this section by describing the main 
specification and then describe the two stages of the analysis.  
 
5.1. The Main Specification  
We want to estimate the change in the (log) wage, , over and above the wage that 
would have prevailed without the tax credit reform—i.e., the “counterfactual” (log) wage, 
. In particular, we want to measure the direct effect of the introduction of the tax credit 
W
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on the wage of the eligible; the indirect effect of the tax credit on all workers; and the effect 
on the wage that can be attributed to the change in generosity of the tax credit from its 
predecessor’s. The latter variable allows us to understand whether increased salience, rather 
than increased generosity, explains (potential) wage changes because some workers will 
receive an increase in tax credit from Family Credit to WFTC and because others who 
previously were not eligible are now eligible. We use the variation in the change in the 
amount of tax credit using the last set of criteria for Family Credit before being abolished to 
capture the effect of a change in generosity with respect to WFTC. 
We estimate the following for worker i:  
௜ܹ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺ ௜ܹ௧௖ሻ ൅ ߚଶ൫ܶܥ௜௧ௗ൯ ൅ ߚଷ൫ܶܥ௚௧௦ ൯ ൅ ߚସ∆ܶܥ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧. (1) 
 
The counterfactual wage, ܹ஼, is the wage that would prevail for worker ݅ at time t in the 
absence of the tax credit, WFTC. We correct this wage variable for changes in average 
earnings and general inflation using quarterly indexes, t. In turn, we do not restrict  to 1 to 
allow for additional flexibility in dealing with the aggregate evolution of wages. With 
adjustments for these trends, the coefficient is likely to be close to but not exactly one. ܶܥௗ 
measures the direct effect of WFTC on eligible workers. ܶܥ௦ measures the indirect (or 
spillover) effect of tax credit on all workers in group ݃ , where ݃  is the determined by industry 
or education grouping. ∆ܶܥ measures the change in the generosity from Family Credit to 
WFTC. We describe each variable in detail below. In addition, we include time fixed effects 
for the whole sample period and we deal with the estimated regressor problem by 
bootstrapping standard errors. In the analysis, we look at men and women separately. 
The direct effect, ܶ ܥௗ, is the amount of WFTC, and ߚଶ measures the extensive margin 
(going from no tax credit to WFTC). A straightforward way in which we could measure  ܶ ܥௗ 
is using a dummy variable for eligibility. However, to have  ܶܥௗ and ∆ܶܥ in the same units, 
such we can separately measure the effect of saliency from a change in tax credit generosity, 
we compute continuous measures of WFTC and its predecessor, Family Credit, to 
disentangle the two effects. In the analysis, in Section 6, we present the results for both 
measures. 
1
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 Using the policy-eligibility criteria, we calculate the amount of WFTC a household 
is eligible for and use this to measure the direct effect of WFTC. We weight the WFTC 
variable by weekly household income, giving us a “WFTC-rate” (i.e., WFTC/weekly 
household income), which is a weighted non-linear variable. ∆ܶܥ measures the change in the 
generosity from Family Credit to WFTC, also weighted by households’ weekly income, 
where ߚସ measures the intensive margin (increased payment for those moving from FC to 
WFTC). In principle, those effects that affect ߚସ should be similar to those that affect ߚଶ, but 
the magnitudes may differ. This seems the most parsimonious specification, as the generosity 
term is in the same units as the saliency term and, hence, it should absorb the linear impact 
of generosity. The nature of these variable allows us to distinguish between the two important 
changes with regard to the WFTC: the change in generosity from Family Credit to WFTC, 
and the change in salience from payment as a welfare benefit to payment through the 
employer. 
Since the amount of WFTC (and Family Credit) for which a household is eligible is 
computed using household income rather than the individual wage, we match earners within 
each household and then estimate the amount of WFTC the household is entitled to claim 
using the eligibility criteria. The weekly WFTC payment has three main parts: (1) a basic 
credit of £59.00 (one for each family); (2) a 30-hour tax credit bonus of £11.45 (where either 
worker in the couple works at least 30 hours per week); and (3) a tax credit of between £19.85 
and £26.00 for each child, depending on their age, in the eligible household.9 The payable 
WFTC is based on all the components added together to make a maximum credit. If 
household income is above £92.90 per week, the maximum WFTC is reduced. In particular, 
there is a reduction of £0.55 for each pound over £92.90. If income is below £92.90, the 
maximum WFTC is payable. In the analysis, we account for changes in the rates over the 
sample period.10 Similarly, when computing ∆ܶܥ, the change from Family Credit to WFTC, 
we use the eligibility criteria for each policy to compute the amount. 
                                                 
9 The criteria also specify that the household should have low savings. The LFS does not report data on savings, 
so we cannot use savings in constructing the WFTC variable. However, because only 3.6 percent of couples 
and 2.7 percent of single parents report having savings over £5,000 and no one on maximum awards reports 
having savings over £5,000, this should not pose a problem (Inland Revenue Quarterly Enquiry, 2001). 
10 The year-on-year changes in tax credit rates are incorporated when calculating WFTC. A summary of 
policy parameters (1999-2002) can be found in Table A.1. 
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The indirect effect, or spillover effect, ܶܥ௦, is a vector that includes the average 
entitlement of WFTC workers (weighted by the fraction of those eligible) in each education 
group and each industry group, separately, where ߚଷ measures this spillover. The analytical 
discussion in Section 2 suggests that as the elasticity of substitution between eligible and 
non-eligible workers increases and/or as the fraction of eligible worker increases, there is a 
spillover effect onto the wages of all “similar” workers. These externalities are often ignored 
in the literature, such that the full policy effect is not measured. Here, we measure the effect 
of WFTC on the wages of all similar workers, regardless of whether they are eligible. 
The representation of eligible workers differs across both the industry and education 
groups. According to a survey of employers report, only 15 percent of employers employed 
WFTC-eligible workers (Coleman et al., 2003). There is no difference in outsourcing of 
payroll services by firms with a higher proportion of WFTC workers; however, WFTC 
employees are more concentrated in some industries than others (see Tables 1a and 1b). To 
construct a variable that captures the spillover effect, we use the variation in WFTC eligibility 
across the industry and education groups separately. We calculate the average entitlement to 
WFTC among workers in each industry and in each education group and then weight it by 
the fraction of eligible workers. Tables 1a and 1b report the number of eligible workers, the 
proportion of eligible workers, and the average WFTC in each education and industry group, 
respectively. From the tables, we see that there is a great deal of variability in these groups, 
and thus, we would expect the indirect effect of WFTC on the wages of workers to be stronger 
the larger the fraction (and importance) of this group. 
The estimate of the spillover effect relies on the assumption that the trend element 
introduced in the counterfactual wage correctly captures the aggregate evolution of wages. 
We add time (quarterly) dummies to capture common trends and to adjust the wage for 
changes in country-level average earnings and general inflation using quarterly indexes. In 
addition, in Section 7.1, we test for the common trends assumption using a placebo treatment. 
Any aggregate shifts in wages associated with WFTC should be captured by the spillover 
variable. Note, however, that the calculation of the direct effect of the WFTC on eligible 
workers does not rely on this assumption. We later show that there is a good match between 
the eligible and non-eligible workers with similar predicted wages; thus, one can interpret 
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the estimates of the direct effect of WFTC as a matching estimate in which non-eligible 
workers who are marginally different from eligible workers act as a control group.  
 
5.2. Step One: The Predicted “Counterfactual” Wage  
Correctly estimating the predicted “counterfactual” wage is key to the rest of our 
analysis. This is the first step in our two-step procedure. We first describe the construction 
of this variable and then provide evidence for its validity. Note that throughout the period, 
Family Credit was in operation, such that effects of WFTC are estimated relative to this 
previous reform. 
We estimate the expected counterfactual (log) wage, ܹ௖, using a linear regression on 
the (log) wage before 1999. This is done by controlling for individual, family and job 
characteristics in the vector, ܺ, where ܺ is a  vector of conditioning variables. The 
controls include the following: Age, Education, Region, Ethnicity, Experience (plus higher 
orders), Tenure (plus higher orders), Marital Status, Number and age of Children, Firm Size, 
Public Ownership, Occupation Type, Industry Type, and Full-time Status. The aim of this 
exercise is to predict the wage as closely as possible to the earned wage without WFTC.11 
The predicted wage, ෡ܹ ௖, is given by: 
 
ܧሺlogܹܽ݃݁|ܺሻ௜௧ ൌ ߙො ௜ܺ௧ ൌ ෡ܹ௜௧௖.  (2) 
 
There are 39,890 observations for men and 40,121for women. The R-squared in both cases 
is approximately 55 percent. Table 2 reports these results for men and women separately. 
 
5.2.1. Validity of the Predicted Wage 
In this section, we address three important assumptions. First, eligible and non-
eligible workers with the same predicted wage are comparable. Second, the residual wage is 
similar for eligible and non-eligible workers in the absence of WFTC. Third, while there are 
                                                 
11 Given that there were other policies similar to WFTC in operation prior to the introduction of WFTC, our 
analysis will give us only the relative change from these policies. As a robustness check, in Section 8, we repeat 
our analysis on an earlier time period to ensure that the differential effects between eligible and non-eligible 
workers did not exist. 
1 K
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some compositional changes over time, there are no important differences between eligible 
and non-eligible workers after WFTC is introduced.12 
Using the main observable characteristics, we check whether eligible and non-eligible 
workers who have the same predicted wage are similar outside the variables that determine 
eligibility. In Tables 3a and 3b, we compare the observable characteristics of matched eligible 
and non-eligible workers before the introduction of WFTC, where the match is based on the 
predicted wage,	 ෡ܹ ௖. We make this comparison at different percentiles of ෡ܹ ௖, with the 
objective of showing that when eligible and non-eligible workers have the same predicted 
wage, they are observably similar. We do this separately for men and women.  
Table 3a shows that for women, as we would expect, there are differences in the 
variables that determine eligibility (hours of work and number of children). However, in the 
other demographic variables, the groups are very similar.13 We capture a majority of our 
eligible sample in the bottom 40 percent of the distribution.14 In Table 3b, for men, we see 
similar patterns. Here, we capture most of our sample in the bottom 30 percent of the 
distribution. 
We estimate the residual wage difference of the predicted wage from the actual wage 
separately for eligible and non-eligible workers before the introduction of WFTC. We then 
compare the distribution of the residuals. From Figures A.6a and A.6b, we see that for both 
men and women, the patterns are very close. These figures highlight the comparability of the 
groups. As a further robustness check, we perform a placebo treatment of the same nature. 
                                                 
12 We estimate the wage model on the pre-period using employed workers only and then predict 
counterfactual wages on the post-period for employed workers, which would include those who were not 
working before. The implicit assumption is, therefore that, had non-workers in the pre-period worked, their 
salary would be close to other employed workers with similar observable characteristics. Azmat 2014 shows 
that there are no significant effects of the policy on the inactivity-activity margin and only very modest effects 
on the employment-unemployment margin. Moreover, given that the minimum wage is binding for the lowest 
paid workers, and that the policy mostly affects low pay workers, there should be common bounds for the 
wages of employed workers and the counterfactual for non-workers. 
13 In Figures A.4 and A.5 we plot the distributions of the continuous characteristics for eligible and non-
eligible group, matched by predicted wages, for men and women, respectively. We see that, with the 
exception of age, the matching is satisfactory. The issue with respect to age relates to the presence of children. 
While the eligible group, by construction, have children aged 16 or under, the non-eligible group may not 
have children or have children who are older than 16. For this reason, the distribution is skewed further to the 
right for the non-eligible group. We plot the age distribution conditioned on the presence of children under the 
age of 16 and find that the match is satisfactory. As a robustness check, we restrict the analysis to those with 
children under the age of 16 and find that the main results are unchanged. These results are reported in Table 
A.4. 
14 When we look at the rest of the distribution, the eligible and non-eligible workers continue to be similar in 
their observable characteristics, but there are fewer observations. 
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We predict the counterfactual wage using one year pre-WFTC (1997) and then estimate the 
residuals for another pre-WFTC year (1998). Here, again, we find that distributions for 
eligible and non-eligible workers are comparable and are similar to those presented in Figures 
A.6a and A.6b. 
An important concern would be if the composition of the eligible versus non-eligible 
group changes as a response to the introduction of WFTC. We show that the relative rates of 
return, , on the vector ܺ remain the same in the post-WFTC period. This is not to say that 
the rates of return are unchanged throughout but that any change in the rates of return are 
similar for both eligible and non-eligible workers with the same predicted wage. Below we 
discuss and show that the analysis does not suffer from these selection issues.  
First, the Quarterly Labour Force Survey dataset used has a detailed education 
variable (which proxies for skill), so we do not have the issue of selection on observables. It 
can be seen from the descriptive statistics in Table 4 that the proportion of people with no 
education who are eligible for the tax credit does not increase relative to the non-eligible 
group after 1999.  
Second, in the case of WFTC, there is evidence to suggest that its overall impact on 
employment and hours of work are small (and, in turn, have a small impact on the 
compositional change of workers). This too can be seen from Table 4, where hours worked 
does not change relative to the non-eligible group after the policy introduction. A number of 
papers have studied the labor supply effect of WFTC on single parents (see Brewer and 
Browne, 2006 and Brewer et al. 2009 for a review of studies). For single parents, mostly 
focused on single mothers, using different data and different methodologies, these papers 
find that employment increased between 0.6 and 5 percentage points.15 On the intensive 
                                                 
15 Blundell et al. (2000) develop a structural model of labor supply identified from past tax and welfare 
reforms, which they then used to simulate the effect of WFTC. Their model showed that WFTC would lead to 
a 2.2 percentage point increase in single parents’ employment. Brewer et al. (2006) report results from an 
updated version of this model, incorporating evidence over the period WFTC was introduced, and find that 
single mothers’ employment rose by 3.7 percentage points. Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007) estimate 
the impact of the whole package of the 1997 Labour Government reform by employing a difference-in-
difference approach, comparing employment of single mothers with that of single women with no children, 
and show that single mothers’ employment rose by 5 percentage points. Using an equilibrium job search 
model, Shephard (2017) takes an integrated view of the tax system to analyses the labor market impact of tax 
reform. He too finds around a 5 percentage point increase in single parents’ employment. Leigh (2007) also 
compares eligible single women with and without children over the short term before and after the 
introduction of WFTC and finds an (insignificant) employment effect of 0.6 percentage points. Gregg, 

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margin, Blundell et al. (2008) show there was an increase in average hours among single 
mothers who remained in employment. Moreover, Gregg, Harkness, and Smith (2009) show 
there was an increase in hours among single mothers working fewer than 16 hours before the 
reform by approximately 3 hours, and there was a reduction in hours among those working 
more than 16 hours before the reform by 1.7 hours. For married couples, overall, studies 
show either no or small (negative or positive) effects of WFTC on the intensive and extensive 
margin. Francesconi, Rainer, van der Klaaw (2009) find no statistically significant labor 
supply effect for married women overall and if their partners worked full-time but around 3 
percentage point effect if their partner did not work or worked less than 16 hours.  They find 
no measurable effect on the labor supply of married men, irrespective of their partner’s 
employment status.16 The small employment change is an important distinction between the 
WFTC and the US Earned Income Tax Credit, which Blundell and Hoynes (2004) discuss in 
detail. In the analysis that follows, we look separately at men and women and, for each, at 
the effect on the sub-samples of married and single parents. 
Finally, the minimum wage in the UK, introduced in April 1999, imposes a lower 
bound below which the employer cannot cut the gross wage. This suggests that an influx of 
lower-skilled workers will not impact the wage as severely as it would have without a 
minimum wage. The minimum wage is a ceiling below which the employer cannot cut the 
wage. In our analysis, we use the minimum wage as a point of censor when measuring the 
policy effectiveness.  
 
5.3. Stage Two: Estimating the Wage Change 
Using the counterfactual wage estimated in the previous section, we now estimate the 
wage change resulting from the introduction of WFTC. In this section, we describe the 
estimation strategy used. 
We estimate: 
 
                                                 
Harkness, Smith (2009) also employ a difference-in-difference approach and compare single mothers 
(parents) with different comparison groups and find that employment increases between 3.8 and 5.2 percent. 
16 In line with what is common in this literature, throughout the article, the terms “marriage,” “couples,” 
“married couples,” and “marital unions” are used in a broad sense to include all types of live-in partnerships, 
such as cohabitations, stepfamilies and blended families. 
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௜ܹ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺ ෡ܹ௜௧௖ ൅ ߚଶ൫ܶܥ௜௧ௗ൯ ൅ ߚଷ൫ܶܥ௚௧௦ ൯ ൅ ߚସ∆ܶܥ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧,   (3) 
 
where ෡ܹ ௖	is the predicted wage, which has been corrected for changes in average earnings 
and general inflation using quarterly indexes, t. We bootstrap with 200 replications when 
constructing the counterfactual wage and when estimating the wage change. All variables are 
as described in equation (1) in Section 5.1. 
To take into account the distortion in wages brought about by the introduction of the 
minimum wage in the UK, we use a censored regression model. In 1999, the minimum wage 
was set at £3.60 for adults aged 22 or older and £3.00 for those aged 18 to 21.17 For those 
with a binding minimum wage, there exists a gap between the actual and predicted wages.18 
For those who are unaffected by the minimum wage (i.e., those who were previously earning 
above the national minimum), no gap exists between the actual and predicted wages.  
We adjust the econometric specification to take into account the left-censoring that is 
generated by the minimum wage. A model that is directly relevant here is the censored least 
absolute deviation (LAD) (Powell, 1984).19 This is a non-parametric specification that has 
the advantage over parametric methods, such as a censored Tobit, that the consistency of the 
estimator does not require knowledge of the distribution of the error term ; nor is it assumed 
that the distribution is homoscedastic, only that it has median zero. In turn, it is robust to non-
normality of the error terms, and it is robust to heteroskedasticity (which is common in most 
cross-sectional datasets).  
Powell (1984) shows that the median function is equal to the function maximum, such 
that: 
                                                 
17 The minimum wage increased to £3.70 (£3.20) in 2000, £4.10 (£3.50) in 2001, and £4.20 (£3.60) in 2002 
for workers aged over 21 (aged 18-21). We account for these increases in our analysis. 
18 Before the introduction of the minimum wage, approximately 3 percent of men and 12 percent of women 
reported an hourly wage at or below the minimum wage. Among the WFTC eligible, this was higher (5 
percent of men and 17 percent of women). 
19 An alternative (parametric) specification is the Tobit model. However, it imposes more assumptions on the 
distribution of the error term. In previous versions of the paper, we estimate equation (3) also using the Tobit 
and find that the results are similar to those of OLS and CLAD. In appendix table A.2, we present the 
regression-based analysis using Tobit for men and women, respectively. . 
iu
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ݍହ଴൫ ௜ܹ௧ห ෡ܹ ௦, ࢀ࡯൯
ൌ max	ሺݓ௠௜௡, ݍହ଴൫ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺ ෡ܹ௜௧௖ ൅ ߚଶ൫ܶܥ௜௧ௗ൯ ൅ ߚଷ൫ܶܥ௚௧௦ ൯ ൅ ߚସ∆ܶܥ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ሻห ෡ܹ ௖, ࢀ࡯൯
ൌ max	ሺݓ௠௜௡, ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺ ෡ܹ௜௧௖ ൅ ߚଶ൫ܶܥ௜௧ௗ൯ ൅ ߚଷ൫ܶܥ௚௧ௌ ൯ ൅ ߚସ∆ܶܥ௜௧ሻ 
 
where ݍହ଴ denotes the median of the distribution conditional on covariates and the median 
distribution of ݑ௜	is assumed to be zero. ݓ௠௜௡ is the national minimum wage and ࢀ࡯ ൌ
ሼܶܥௗ, ܶܥௌ, ∆ܶܥ	ሽ. The objective of the censored LAD is to consistently estimate the vector 
of ߚ by the parameter vector that minimizes: 
෍ห ௜ܹ െ max	ሺݓ௠௜௡, ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺ ෡ܹ௜௧௖ ൅ ߚଶ൫ܶܥ௜௧ௗ൯ ൅ ߚଷ൫ܶܥ௚௧௦ ൯ ൅ ߚସ∆ܶܥ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ሻห
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
In the analysis that follows, we use this specification as well as standard ordinary least 
squares. 
 
Section 6: Results 
In this section, we start with a graphical representation of our main results. We then 
present the regression-based analysis using OLS and the censored LAD on log wages for 
men and women, respectively. The latter estimation adjusts the econometric specification (3) 
to take into account the left-censoring generated by the minimum wage. In addition, we look 
separately at the results for single men, married (or cohabiting) men, single women and 
married (or cohabiting) women.  
The regression results in Tables 5 and 6 estimate the equations in Section 5.3. We 
report the marginal effects of WFTC and the spillover effect on the actual (log) wage between 
2000 and 2003.  
 
6.1 Graphical Representation 
We start by showing a simple graphical analysis that illustrates the identification 
strategy. The graphs are a simple representation of the regression-based analysis; however, 
they summarize well some of the key results of the policy impact.  
In Figures 2a and 3a, we show the densities of the log difference between actual and 
predicted wages for WFTC-eligible workers and “similar” non-eligible workers. These 
24 
 
similar workers are the non-eligible workers in industries and education groups with a high 
density of eligible workers, respectively. We observe that the wage distribution of the treated 
workers is to the left of the wage distribution observed for the non-eligible workers. This 
shows that the policy had an effect and that this effect was negative, resulting in lower than 
predicted wages after the policy was implemented compared with the non-eligible workers. 
Moreover, we see that the treatment affects all parts of the distribution. The results are 
unchanged when we look at the different groups. 
Given the possibility of a treatment spillover onto the non-eligible similar workers, 
we further compare these workers with an alternative group that has a low eligibility 
probability. The differences between these two groups illustrate the existence of spillover 
effects to workers who are non-eligible but have similar characteristics to those eligible. 
From Figures 2b and 3b, we see that while the spillover effect is less striking than the direct 
effect, when using the industry-group variation, the wage distribution of the eligible-similar 
workers is to the left of the wage distribution observed for the non-eligible-less similar 
workers. 
In Figures 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b, we replicate the above analysis for women. Interestingly, 
we see that while the direct effects are small, the spillover effects are more notable. In 
particular, from Figure 5b, we see that while there is a negative effect on the top half of the 
distribution, there is a positive effect on the bottom half. This may be a consequence of the 
minimum wage, which binds for the bottom of the distribution.  
In the analysis that follows, we will quantify these results and test their robustness. 
 
6.2. Regression Analysis  
The regressions are first performed for men, with the output displayed in Table 5. The 
results are shown for the OLS and the CLAD estimation.20 Columns (1) and (2) show the 
results for all men for the OLS and the CLAD estimation, respectively. Columns (3) to (6) 
show the results separately for single and married men for each estimation strategy, 
                                                 
20 The number of observations is very slightly lower for CLAD because the estimation technique used for the 
CLAD estimator is an iterative linear programming algorithm for which observations are dropped if the 
predicted value is less than the censoring value when the left tail of the distribution is censored, or they are 
dropped if the predicted value is greater than the censoring value when the right tail of the distribution is 
censored.  
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respectively. As an alternative specification, we report the main results using a WFTC 
eligibility variable instead of the tax credit amount. The results, shown in Table A.3, are 
similar to those shown for men and women in Tables 5 and 6. Although this is a more 
straightforward approach to computing the tax credit amounts (i.e., closer to the more 
standard approach of using eligible or not), the coefficient on eligibility may also capture the 
intensive margin (generosity). Using the continuous measure allows us to include a measure 
that take into account the tax credit amount change from Family Credit and WFTC. 
From Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, three striking results emerge from the analysis 
of men. The first is that a WFTC-eligible worker has a decline in his gross wage relative to 
a similarly skilled non-eligible worker who has the same predicted wage. The coefficients 
are larger in the censored specification than in the linear specification (0.278 versus 0.143). 
From column (2), we see that as the rate of WFTC increases for the eligible worker, the gross 
wage falls relative to that of a similarly skilled non-eligible worker. Calculated at the average 
WFTC rate, which is 0.24, this is equivalent to a decrease in gross wages of approximately 7 
percent. When we evaluate this at the average weekly wage of £216 and the average weekly 
WFTC of £45, this implies that there is a 30 percent shift in incidence from the eligible 
worker to the employer. 
The second important result is that there is a strong and negative spillover effect on 
non-eligible workers when we look by industry and by education group. The results from 
both specifications are similar and imply that for every pound of the tax credit, there is a 
negative spillover of WFTC on the wages of non-eligible workers in a given education group. 
From column (2), the coefficients of 0.29 implies that, when evaluated at the average fraction 
of WFTC workers in an education group, wages of non-eligible workers decrease by 1.7 
percent while the fraction of men eligible for WFTC increases by one percent in an education 
group. Similarly, when looking at spillovers within given industry groups, we find that wages 
fall for all workers. Evaluated at the average fraction of WFTC workers in an industry, wages 
for all similar workers decrease by 0.9 percent. This is of critical policy importance, as we 
can no longer assume that a partial analysis of the tax credit is sufficient when trying to 
understand all the consequences of the policy. Studies of the effect of taxes and benefits on 
other groups often ignore this group. Moreover, because the spillover affects the wages of 
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eligible workers as well, this is equivalent to an 8 percent shift in tax credit incidence to the 
employer, over and above the shift from the direct effect. 
Finally, a change in tax credit generosity from Family Credit to WFTC does not have 
a significant effect. This is the case for both specifications (columns 1 and 2).21 This implies 
that the effect on gross wages is a result of the change in payment method (i.e., payment 
through the employer). This is important to our understanding of the mechanism through 
which the incidence of the tax credit can be shared. The result implies that even in the absence 
of an increase in the tax credit, increased salience of the tax credit to the employer can lead 
to a shift in the incidence of the tax credit. When looking separately at single and married 
men in columns (3) to (6) in Table 5, we find similar patterns across the groups and 
specifications. The results, however, become less precise when we look at single men, which 
likely reflects the small number of single fathers claiming WFTC. The distinction by marital 
status is more relevant when looking at women because the proportion of single mothers is 
relatively larger than that of single fathers. 
As noted earlier, it is traditional to focus on women when looking at the participation 
effects of tax credits. However, when looking at wage changes, the reasoning for this is less 
obvious because men are at least as, if not more, likely to claim the tax credit through their 
employer. In particular, in a coupled household, because the male partner is more likely to 
be the household member in the labor force, he is also more likely to be the claimant. The 
results in Table 6, which present the results for women, offer interesting insights and confirm 
this hypothesis.   
Table 6 presents the results for women from the OLS and CLAD estimation. From 
columns (1) and (2), we see that the direct effect is small and positive when using the linear 
specification but is close to zero (and insignificant) when we take into account the left-
censoring that is generated by the minimum wage (column 2). Moreover, from columns (3) 
to (6), when separating by marital status, the results suggest that the direct effect of WFTC 
is negative only for single mothers and positive for married women. However, these results 
are not very stable across the different specifications. One explanation for why the direct 
effect is stronger for men than for women may be that women have a lower average wage 
                                                 
21 The effect, however, does not take into account potential changes in the generosity from childcare 
expenses.  
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than men and work, on average, fewer hours, so the potential incidences from WFTC are 
smaller. Alternatively, it may be that women are more likely to be “protected” from a wage 
(growth) cut because of the minimum-wage barrier.  
We do, however, find that for women there is a strong and negative spillover effect 
by both industry and education groups. This result implies that as the fraction of eligible 
women increases in the workplace, there is a larger wage drop for everyone in the same skill 
group (i.e., those with the same predicted wage). This is consistent with the idea that the shift 
in the burden of the tax credit increases with the fraction of eligible workers. When 
comparing the results from the different estimation techniques, the results remain consistent, 
but the order of magnitude of the coefficients changes. From column (2), the education 
(industry) spillover coefficient of 3 (9) percent implies that, when evaluated at the average 
fraction of WFTC workers in an education (industry) group, wages of non-eligible workers 
fall by 0.4 percent (1.0 percent) while the fraction of women eligible for WFTC increases by 
one percent in an education (industry) group. 
We check how sensitive the results are to alternative measures of hours worked, to 
removing the proxy respondents, to removing those who report a wage below or at the 
national minimum after its introduction, to restrict the analysis to those for whom the change 
in generosity from Family Credit to WFTC was small, and to restricting the counterfactual 
group to those with children of school age. These results are summarized in Table A.4 and 
described below.  
Although eligibility is based on discrete hours cut-offs, as a robustness check, we use 
actual hours worked (a continuous measure). In Table A.4, columns (1) and (2), we show 
that if we predict wages using hours worked, the results for are similar for men and women: 
the (negative) direct effect is stronger but still much smaller in magnitude than for men and 
is only marginally significant. Second, we might be concerned that proxy respondents for 
eligible workers are more (or less) likely to misreport wages than for similar non-eligible 
workers. We exclude proxy respondents from the analysis, and from columns (3) and (4) of 
Table A.4, we find that the main results hold. For both men and women, the coefficients 
remain mostly unchanged, suggesting that the results are not driven by differentials in the 
response by proxy respondents. To address another potential issue of misreporting, we 
investigate the effect of reporting below the national minimum wage after its introduction on 
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the main results. After the introduction of the national minimum wage, 1 percent of men and 
3 percent of women in the sample report a wage below the national minimum. From columns 
(5) and (6), we see that when we exclude these workers, as well as those who report a wage 
at the national minimum, from the sample, the results do not change with respect to the 
baseline results. In columns (7) and (8) we report the results for those who were previously 
eligible for Family Credit, which was paid directly to them, and are now eligible for WFTC, 
but for whom the change in the amount they receive is small (i.e., less than £10 extra per 
week). We find that there is still a negative effect on wages, further suggesting that the 
method of payment is important. Finally, we restrict the analysis to workers with children 
under the age of 16. By construction, those receiving WFTC have children, however, among 
the control group, some may not have children or have children over the age of 16. From 
columns (9) and (10) we see that our results are robust within this subsample of workers.    
 
Section 7: Extensions and Robustness 
In this section, we conduct some robustness checks and broaden our analysis to 
investigate some interesting questions. First, we conduct a falsification test using our two-
stage estimation on pre-policy years. Second, we consider whether the size of the firm has 
any impact on the share in incidence between workers and firms.  
 
7.1. Test of the Common Trends Assumption 
The identification strategy we use relies on a common trend assumption. The ߚଵin 
equation (3) is flexible, such that it adjusts to pick-up parallel changes in common trends. 
However, here we provide further evidence through a falsification test that the common trend 
assumption holds in a sample period before WFTC. To ensure that the observed differential 
effects on wages between eligible and ineligible workers did not exist prior to the 
introduction of WFTC, we replicate our analysis by performing placebo estimation on data 
before 1997.22 Policies to help families with children have been used in the UK since the 
1970s. In particular, given that WFTC’s predecessor was similar to WFTC, we can only 
measure relative changes from the previous policies and not the absolute effect of tax credit 
policies.  
                                                 
22 This is the period prior to the changes by the Labour Government that was elected in May 1997. 
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Using data from 1994 to 1995, inclusive, to perform the first stage of our analysis and 
data from 1996 to 1997, inclusive, for the second stage, we report our results in Table 7. It 
can be seen that during this period there was no differential effect. Additionally, to account 
for potential local labor market differences and the geographic variability in productivity 
over time, we interact region with industry when constructing the counterfactual wage. The 
results are presented in columns (1) and (2) Table A.5 for men and women, respectively. 
Similarly in columns (3) and (4) of Table A.5, we interact industry with trends when 
constructing the counterfactual wage. This should allow for a differential growth by industry 
and also for differential industry inflation rates. While the main result holds, the (industry) 
spillover effect increases slightly. 
 
7.2. Policy Anticipation Effect 
The introduction of the Working Families’ Tax Credit was announced in March 1998 
before its actual introduction in October 1999. Although not all the features were publicized, 
the government announced that this tax credit would replace Family Credit. Francesconi and 
van der Klaauw (2004), and in a more recent paper, Blundell, Francesconi and van der 
Klaauw (2011), argue that the anticipation effects of WFTC are important in the labor market 
and other behavioral responses. As a robustness check, we adjust the analysis to take into 
account that employers and workers may have adjusted their behaviors before the actual 
introduction of WFTC. We do this by excluding from the analysis the period between the 
announcement and the implementation. From Table 8, it can be seen that the main findings 
remain largely unchanged. 
 
7.3. Firm Size 
There is a large body of literature relating the size of the firm to the wage level in that 
firm. Brown and Medoff (1989) conclude that one of the main reasons wages are higher in 
larger firms is that they hire better-quality workers. In a competitive model, we would expect 
the hourly wages to be the same for similar workers. In it quite likely that in larger firms, 
there will be multiple workers with the same job-title.  By applying the methodology used in 
Section 5, we compare: (1) small-sized firms (employing 1-19 workers); (2) medium-sized 
firms (20-49 workers); and (3) large-sized firms (more than 50 workers). 
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    We replicate our earlier analysis for each firm-size category and report the results 
in Table 9. We find that as the size of the firm increases, the degree of “spillover” by industry 
also increases. This seems quite reasonable, given that larger firms have more uniformity in 
wage contracts across workers (i.e., workers performing identical jobs and receiving the same 
hourly wage). Here, it would be more difficult for the employer to cut the gross wage of only 
those eligible for WFTC and to leave the wage of the non-eligible workers unchanged.  
 
Section 8: Conclusion 
    The results presented in this paper show that when tax credits in the UK were paid 
directly through the employer rather than as a welfare benefit, there was a significant shift in 
the burden of tax credits. Firms adjusted wages downwards after observing directly the tax 
credits paid to workers. In equilibrium, the average wage of similar workers that did not 
receive WFTC also adjusted downwards. The change in the visibility to the employer, and 
not the change in the amount of additional tax credit, explains this shift, and suggests that the 
individual wage bargaining between the firm and each given employee plays a role in tax 
incidence. This is the first paper to investigate the effects of the change in salience from the 
viewpoint of the employer (donor) rather than from that of the employee (recipient).  
Another key finding in the paper is that the introduction of WFTC implied a 
(negative) spillover onto the wages of similarly skilled non-eligible workers. This is of 
critical policy importance, as we can no longer assume that a partial analysis of the tax credit 
is sufficient when trying to understand all the consequences of the policy. Studies of the 
effect of taxes and benefits on other groups often ignore this group. 
The UK government spent a great deal on this policy relative to previous policies, 
with the aim to “make-work-pay.” By paying recipients through their employers rather than 
directly, they intended to reduce the stigma attached to receiving tax credits in the form of a 
welfare benefit. The literature has shown that WFTC increased the labor supply among single 
mothers by as much as 5 percent, with no labor supply effect on other groups, only an 
increased household income. While the success of the policy can be measured in these terms, 
one needs to measure its benefits in their entirety by incorporating the costs associated with 
the wage changes. This is important not only for tax credits such as the WFTC but also for 
other taxes and benefits that are visible and/or can be extracted by another group in the 
economy. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1a: The Number of WFTC-eligible by Industry 
 
  Total  No. of Eligible 
% of 
Eligible/Total 
Average WFTC 
Rate 
Agriculture & Fishing 1,512 174 11.51% 0.37 
Energy & Water 2,518 57 2.26% 0.2 
Manufacturing 35,086 1,585 4.52% 0.28 
Construction 10,033 507 5.05% 0.28 
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants 39,054 5,369 13.75% 0.64 
Transport & Communication 14,011 776 5.54% 0.33 
Banking, Finance, Insurance 30,189 1,576 5.22% 0.37 
Public Admin, Education & Health 62,676 5,331 8.51% 0.44 
Other Services 9,746 1,068 10.96% 0.61 
 
Table 1b: The Number of WFTC-eligible by Education Group 
 
  Total No. of Eligible 
% of 
Eligible/Total 
Average WFTC 
Rate 
University 37,696 572 1.52% 0.01 
High School_18 (A-Level or equiv.) 79,036 5,181 6.56% 0.13 
High School_16 (GCSE or equiv.) 65,914 7,818 11.86% 0.23 
No Qualifications 21,355 2,828 13.24% 0.11 
 
NOTES: Data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (2001-2003). Total describes the total number of workers (aged 21 to 60) in 
each group. No. of Eligible are the number of workers eligible for WFTC, and the Average WFTC Rate is the average WFTC amount divided 
by (predicted) household income for all eligible in each group. These figures show the averages by combining men and women, but in the 
analysis, we use the averages for each group separately. 
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Table 2: The Predicted (log) Wage  
 
 Men Women  Cont.  Men Women  Cont.  Men Women 
Age (25-34) 0.240*** 0.164*** South West 0.0700*** 0.0285** Ind. (Construction) 0.157*** 0.00106 
 [0.00706] [0.00635]   [0.0156] [0.0141]  [0.0190] [0.0286] 
Age (35-44) 0.285*** 0.193*** Wales 0.0385** 0.0434*** Ind. (Distri, Hotels, Rest) -0.0158 -0.112*** 
 [0.00799] [0.00720]   [0.0168] [0.0150]  [0.0185] [0.0249] 
Age (45-54) 0.272*** 0.162*** Strathclyde 0.0315* 0.0325** Ind. (Transp & Com) 0.102*** 0.0365 
 [0.00873] [0.00780]   [0.0171] [0.0153]  [0.0190] [0.0260] 
Age (55-60) 0.186*** 0.121*** Rest of Scotland 0.0573*** 0.0396*** Ind. (Banking, Finance, Ins) 0.225*** 0.0869*** 
 [0.0106] [0.0104]   [0.0164] [0.0146]  [0.0188] [0.0249] 
Black -0.110*** -0.0499*** Northern Ireland -0.00504 -0.00859 Ind. (Public Admin) 0.0898*** -0.0670*** 
 [0.0171] [0.0143]   [0.0180] [0.0161]  [0.0199] [0.0251] 
Asian -0.148*** -0.0639*** Part time -0.0842*** -0.0429*** Ind. (Other Services) 0.029 -0.0811*** 
 [0.0129] [0.0129]   [0.0105] [0.00409]  [0.0204] [0.0257] 
Other Ethnic -0.140*** -0.0271 Public Sector 0.0163** 0.0863*** Ind. (Work outside UK) 0.323*** -0.361** 
 [0.0291] [0.0253]   [0.00774] [0.00547]  [0.0944] [0.170] 
Married 0.107*** 0.0130** No. Children (1) 0.00203 0.00342 Tenure -0.00446 0.00125 
 [0.00582] [0.00529]   [0.0143] [0.0118]  [0.0116] [0.00975] 
Divorced/Widowed 0.0712*** 0.0180** No. Children (2) 0.0303** -0.00642 Tenure2 -2.36E-05 6.58E-06 
 [0.00933] [0.00721]   [0.0154] [0.0127]  [6.12e-05] [5.15e-05] 
High School_18 -0.199*** -0.157*** No. Children (3) 0.0163 -0.0382*** Experience 0.00243*** 0.00266*** 
 [0.00600] [0.00595]   [0.0172] [0.0148]  [0.000190] [0.000192] 
High School_16 -0.287*** -0.240*** No. Children (4 +) -0.0414* -0.0576** Experience2 -1.13e-05*** -1.62e-05*** 
 [0.00662] [0.00629]   [0.0235] [0.0238]  [2.07e-06] [2.38e-06] 
No Qualifications -0.377*** -0.327*** Occ. (Manager) 0.421*** 0.497*** Experience3 2.99e-08*** 5.31e-08*** 
 [0.00874] [0.00788]   [0.00887] [0.0134]  [7.34e-09] [9.61e-09] 
Rest of NE 0.021 0.00196 Occ. (Professional) 0.348*** 0.657*** Experience4 -2.35E-11** -6.09e-11*** 
 [0.0186] [0.0165]   [0.00971] [0.0144]  [6.89e-12] [1.22e-11 ] 
Gtr Manchester 0.0419** 0.0259* Occ. (Asso. Prof) 0.283*** 0.431*** Constant 1.439*** 1.418*** 
 [0.0174] [0.0155]   [0.00982] [0.0137]  [0.0301] [0.0339] 
Merseyside -0.00152 -0.00648 Occ. (Clerical) -0.0172* 0.208*** Observations 39890 40121 
 [0.0200] [0.0175]   [0.00996] [0.0127] R-squared 0.546 0.553 
Rest of NW 0.0407** 0.0281* Occ. (Craft) 0.0439*** 0.0641***  
 [0.0168] [0.0150]   [0.00915] [0.0133]      
South Yorkshire 0.0168 -0.0056 Occ. (Personnel) 0.120*** 0.109***  
 [0.0189] [0.0171]   [0.0113] [0.0136]      
West Yorkshire 0.0494*** 0.0399** Occ. (Sales) -0.0472*** 0.0144  
 [0.0175] [0.0156]   [0.00937] [0.0140]      
Rest of Yorkshire 0.0582*** 0.00242 Occ. (Plant/Mach.) -0.0998*** -0.0392***  
 [0.0180] [0.0163]   [0.0104] [0.0137]      
East Midlands 0.0499*** 0.0225 Occ. (Others) -0.0778*** -0.0526***  
 [0.0159] [0.0143]   [0.0172] [0.0157]      
West Midlands 0.0774*** 0.0395*** Size Firm (11-19) 0.0775*** 0.0472***  
 [0.0168] [0.0153]   [0.00812] [0.00646]      
Rest of W. Mid. 0.0729*** 0.0296** Size Firm (20-24) 0.108*** 0.0630***  
 [0.0164] [0.0148]   [0.00939] [0.00788]      
Eastern 0.160*** 0.105*** Size Firm (25-49) 0.111*** 0.0702***      
 [0.0155] [0.0140]   [0.00712] [0.00595]  
Inner London 0.282*** 0.292*** Size Firm (50+) 0.197*** 0.124***      
 [0.0182] [0.0161]   [0.00571] [0.00473]  
Outer London 0.255*** 0.248*** Ind. (Energy & Water) 0.242*** 0.127***      
 [0.0161] [0.0144]   [0.0226] [0.0332]  
South East 0.187*** 0.131*** Ind. (Manu) 0.142*** 0.0452*      
 [0.0151] [0.0136]   [0.0185] [0.0251]  
 
NOTES: Data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (1997-1999). The coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. 
*** represents significance at the 1% level, ** represents significance at the 5% level and *represents significance at the 10% level. The 
sample includes individuals aged 21-60. Full-time students, the sick/disabled, or those in government training programs are removed from 
the sample. A detailed description of all variables can be found in the external appendix. 
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Table 3a: Descriptive Statistics for Women – Matched (pre-WFTC) 
 
  5% ൑ ෡ܹ ௖ ൏ 10% 10% ൑ ෡ܹ ௖ ൏ 15% 15% ൑ ෡ܹ ௖ ൏ 20%
  Ineligible Eligible   Ineligible Eligible   Ineligible Eligible   
  Mean SD Mean SD p-value Mean SD Mean SD p-value Mean SD Mean SD p-value 
Age 37.47 10.77 34.86 7.25 0.06 38.00 10.45 35.38 7.05 0.06 38.54 10.39 36.19 7.14 0.07 
White 0.97 0.17 0.95 0.22 0.15 0.96 0.19 0.97 0.17 0.26 0.97 0.18 0.97 0.18 0.47 
No Qual. 0.36 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.11 0.32 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.12 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.44 0.22 
Public 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.41 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.29 0.21 0.40 0.25 0.43 0.18 
Size of Firm 2.91 2.08 2.97 2.10 0.36 3.45 2.17 3.30 2.13 0.23 3.78 2.16 3.70 2.10 0.33 
Tenure 24.52 24.08 20.96 20.62 0.12 29.66 27.04 27.72 26.65 0.24 33.16 27.41 30.08 26.49 0.19 
Experience 37.73 48.24 25.22 29.63 0.05 45.26 50.52 35.06 38.77 0.08 54.89 57.21 38.87 39.41 0.06 
Single 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.42 0.43 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.35 
Hours 24.81 13.42 20.71 11.40 0.05 26.24 13.32 20.99 12.52 0.05 27.08 12.79 21.25 10.96 0.04 
Children 0.43 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.43 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.42 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.01 
 Obs. 1185   396     1194   343     1157   301     
   20% ൑ ෡ܹ ௖ ൏ 25% 25% ൑ ෡ܹ ௖ ൏ 30%          
   Ineligible Eligible   Ineligible Eligible            
   Mean SD Mean SD p-value Mean SD Mean SD p-value          
Age 38.96 9.97 36.40 7.18 0.06 39.80 9.91 36.18 6.34 0.04          
White 0.97 0.18 0.95 0.22 0.19 0.97 0.17 0.93 0.25 0.12          
No Qual. 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.37 0.15          
Public 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.19 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.45          
Size of Firm 4.03 2.10 4.00 2.13 0.43 4.13 2.12 3.85 2.16 0.14          
Tenure 34.85 28.33 33.69 28.87 0.34 36.96 29.90 34.51 27.88 0.24          
Experience 61.24 61.91 47.17 48.02 0.07 69.47 66.41 52.05 50.40 0.06          
Single 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.48 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.46          
Hours 27.99 12.41 22.86 12.05 0.05 28.43 12.93 22.33 11.58 0.04          
Children 0.41 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.48 1.00 0.00 0.01          
 Obs.  1263   307     1336   291              
 
NOTES: Data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (1998). The sample includes individuals aged 21 to 60. Full-time students, the sick/disabled, or those in government training programs are removed 
from the sample. Using the predicted wage,	 ෡ܹ ௖, we match eligible and non-eligible workers and compare workers at different percentiles in the distribution of ෡ܹ ௖. Age of individual ranges from 21 to 60. 
White takes value 1 if the individual is white and 0 otherwise. No Qual. takes value 1 if the individual has no qualifications and 0 otherwise. Public takes value 1 if the individual works in the public sector 
and 0 otherwise. Size of firm takes values 1 to 7, where size of firm is bracketed (1-10, 11-19, 20-24, 25-49, 50+), 1 represents the smallest firm size and 7 the largest. Tenure and Experience are measured in 
months. Single takes value 1 when the individual is single and 0 otherwise. Hours measures the hours of work. Children takes value 1 if dependent children are present in the household. 
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Table 3b: Descriptive Statistics for Men – Matched (pre-WFTC) 
 
  5% ൑ ෡ܹ ௖ ൏ 10% 10% ൑ ෡ܹ ௖ ൏ 15% 15% ൑ ෡ܹ ௖ ൏ 20%
  Ineligible Eligible  Ineligible Eligible   Ineligible Eligible   
  Mean SD Mean SD p-value Mean SD Mean SD p-value Mean SD Mean SD p-value 
Age 34.62 12.24 34.11 8.88 0.30 36.46 11.81 34.88 7.75 0.14 37.58 11.31 35.32 8.48 0.12 
White 0.95 0.23 0.82 0.39 0.07 0.96 0.21 0.86 0.34 0.10 0.95 0.22 0.91 0.28 0.21 
No Qual. 0.24 0.43 0.32 0.47 0.13 0.22 0.41 0.27 0.45 0.20 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.29 
Public 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.27 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.28 0.20 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.44 
Size of Firm 3.60 2.16 2.77 2.09 0.06 3.95 2.14 3.17 2.13 0.08 4.26 2.06 3.99 2.15 0.22 
Tenure 26.69 25.62 23.40 23.73 0.19 27.92 26.53 25.15 24.66 0.25 31.29 27.88 27.43 24.29 0.21 
Experience 41.65 56.44 35.02 42.81 0.15 50.15 67.89 56.95 78.00 0.25 63.09 75.75 42.17 49.79 0.08 
Single 0.59 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.04 0.48 0.50 0.19 0.39 0.04 0.41 0.49 0.19 0.40 0.06 
Hours 43.97 15.27 35.26 10.41 0.03 45.09 14.19 37.93 7.75 0.03 45.43 11.70 35.98 7.44 0.03 
Children 0.18 0.39 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.44 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.31 0.46 1.00 0.00 0.01 
Obs. 1474   188     1380   133     1463   104     
   20% ൑ ෡ܹ ௖ ൏ 25% 25% ൑ ෡ܹ ௖ ൏ 30%          
   Ineligible Eligible   Ineligible Eligible            
   Mean SD Mean SD p-value Mean SD Mean SD p-value          
Age 38.49 11.01 36.10 7.37 0.11 38.76 10.83 38.86 7.21 0.47          
White 0.96 0.20 0.83 0.38 0.10 0.96 0.20 0.95 0.22 0.45          
No Qual. 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.46 0.12 0.15 0.36 0.24 0.43 0.20          
Public 0.15 0.35 0.09 0.28 0.15 0.16 0.36 0.21 0.42 0.27          
Size of Firm 4.44 2.01 4.56 2.06 0.34 4.53 1.95 4.24 2.15 0.27          
Tenure 33.87 29.41 28.71 24.67 0.19 37.51 29.37 25.49 29.33 0.14          
Experience 73.89 83.49 59.35 69.15 0.16 80.49 82.44 63.79 81.54 0.21          
Single 0.35 0.48 0.13 0.34 0.06 0.28 0.45 0.12 0.33 0.10          
Hours 45.82 12.61 36.57 5.69 0.02 45.61 11.47 33.43 8.67 0.04          
Children 0.32 0.47 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.48 1.00 0.00 0.01          
Obs. 1672   82     1181   42              
 
NOTES: Data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (1998). The sample includes individuals aged 21 to 60. Full-time students, the sick/disabled, or those in government training programs 
are removed from the sample. Using the predicted wage,	 ෡ܹ ௖, we match eligible and non-eligible workers and compare workers at different percentiles in the distribution of ෡ܹ ௖. See Table 3a for a 
description of the variables. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics Before and After 1999 - Unmatched 
 
  Ineligible Eligible 
  Before  After   Before  After   
  Mean SD Mean SD p-value Mean SD Mean SD p-value 
Age 38.00 11.28 38.53 11.23 0.04 33.78 9.01 34.22 9.13 0.12 
White 0.96 0.19 0.96 0.19 0.33 0.92 0.27 0.92 0.27 0.32 
No Qualifications 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.38 0.06 
Public 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.10 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.35 
Tenure 33.51 28.99 33.05 27.82 0.13 25.63 25.73 27.16 25.67 0.11 
Experience 93.04 96.56 93.62 97.86 0.25 43.56 53.66 45.61 55.51 0.15 
Single 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.46 0.29 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.16 
Hours 37.01 13.48 37.00 14.12 0.44 24.21 12.69 24.02 12.47 0.29 
Real Hourly Wage 8.38 5.39 8.90 5.78 0.02 5.26 3.12 5.64 3.25 0.05 
Small Firms 0.29 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.19 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.17 
Medium Firms 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.30 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.15 
Large Firms 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.17 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.49 
Observations 63350 56930   5372 5002   
 
NOTES: Data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey. The Before period is for 1997-1998, and the After period is for 2000-2001. Here, we 
see the means and standard deviations in brackets for each group. The sample includes individuals aged 21-60. Full-time students, the 
sick/disabled, or those in government training programs are removed from the sample. Small Firms is the percentage of workers working in firms 
with fewer than 25 workers. Medium Firms is the proportion of workers working in firms with 25 to 49 workers. Large Firms is the proportion 
of workers working in firms with more than 50 workers. See the notes for Table 3a for a description of all other variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Table 5: Effect of WFTC on Ln(Wages) for Men 
 
  Ln (Wages) 
  OLS CLAD OLS CLAD 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
  ALL ALL Single Married Single Married 
Predicted wage 0.991*** 0.986*** 0.959*** 1.004*** 0.951*** 1.000*** 
  [0.00555] [0.00564] [0.00940] [0.00618] [0.00981] [0.00737] 
WFTC -0.143*** -0.278*** -0.108* -0.142*** -0.258*** -0.268*** 
  [0.0317] [0.0489] [0.0600] [0.0398] [0.0769] [0.0606] 
FC Generosity  -0.0564 0.160 0.128 -0.201* 0.210 0.0352 
  [0.0796] [0.109] [0.131] [0.116] [0.170] [0.138] 
Spillover (Industry) -0.0871* -0.177*** -0.300*** 0.0281 -0.397*** -0.0734 
  [0.0486] [0.0535] [0.0769] [0.0665] [0.0858] [0.0676] 
Spillover (Education) -0.196*** -0.297*** 0.394*** -0.539*** 0.342*** -0.672*** 
  [0.0562] [0.0596] [0.0768] [0.0694] [0.0980] [0.0770] 
Constant 0.290*** 0.305*** 0.329*** 0.277*** 0.348*** 0.293*** 
  [0.0149] [0.0157] [0.0236] [0.0181] [0.0259] [0.0209] 
 Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 76,245 76,147 25,661 50,584 25,634 50,534 
 
NOTES: The coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. *** represents significance at the 1% 
level, ** represents significance at the 5% level and * represents significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped with 200 replications. We include a full set of time dummies (each quarter of each year) in all the 
regressions. The regression is based on equation (3), where Predicted wage ( ෡ܹ ௖ሻ is the predicted wage, which has 
been corrected for changes in average earnings and general inflation using quarterly indexes, t. WFTC (ܶܥௗ), 
calculated as the weekly WFTC divided by households’ weekly (predicted) income, measures the direct effect of 
WFTC on eligible workers. FC Generosity (∆ܶܥ) is the change in households’ entitlement from Family Credit to 
WFTC divided by households’ weekly (predicted) income. Spillover (ܶܥ௦) is the average WFTC (weighted by the 
fraction of eligible) in each industry group (Industry) and education group (Education), respectively. 
 
Table 6: Effect of WFTC on Ln(Wages) for Women 
 
  Ln (Wages) 
  OLS CLAD OLS CLAD 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
  ALL ALL Single Married Single Married 
Predicted wage 0.992*** 1.015*** 0.961*** 1.008*** 0.977*** 1.038*** 
  [0.00387] [0.00411] [0.00676] [0.00475] [0.00693] [0.00504] 
WFTC 0.0429*** 0.000308 0.0341** 0.0433*** -0.0167 0.00339 
  [0.0103] [0.00946] [0.0152] [0.0133] [0.0135] [0.0132] 
FC Generosity  -0.0700** -0.0109 -0.0890 -0.0710 -0.0259 -0.0147 
  [0.0353] [0.0314] [0.0559] [0.0444] [0.0470] [0.0419] 
Spillover (Industry) -0.138*** -0.0927*** -0.120*** -0.149*** -0.0765*** -0.0935*** 
  [0.0146] [0.0153] [0.0221] [0.0215] [0.0250] [0.0192] 
Spillover (Education) -0.0325** -0.0254* 0.132*** -0.130*** 0.126*** -0.109*** 
  [0.0141] [0.0144] [0.0220] [0.0178] [0.0235] [0.0180] 
Constant 0.264*** 0.203*** 0.296*** 0.252*** 0.249*** 0.175*** 
  [0.00975] [0.0108] [0.0171] [0.0124] [0.0179] [0.0133] 
 Time Dummies Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 80,878 80,432 28,604 52,274 28,451 51,965 
 
NOTES: The coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. *** represents significance at the 1% level, 
** represents significance at the 5% level and * represents significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are bootstrapped 
with 200 replications. We include a full set of time dummies (each quarter of each year) in all the regressions. For 
definitions of variables, see Table 5. 
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Table 7: Falsification Tests – Placebo Treatment before WFTC Introduced 
 
  Men Women 
  Ln (Wages) 
  1996 1996-1997 1996 1996-1997 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Predicted wage 1.014*** 1.013*** 1.042*** 1.044*** 
  [0.0116] [0.00860] [0.0102] [0.00678] 
WFTC -0.171* -0.0654 -0.00288 0.00593 
  [0.0933] [0.120] [0.0191] [0.0138] 
FC Generosity  0.367 -0.0549 -0.00650 -0.0294 
  [0.236] [0.262] [0.0966] [0.0657] 
Spillover (Industry) 0.0188 0.0190 -0.0145** -0.0199*** 
  [0.0300] [0.0208] [0.00648] [0.00427] 
Spillover (Education) 0.0236 -0.0227 0.0402 0.0657*** 
  [0.145] [0.106] [0.0294] [0.0208] 
Constant -0.0275 0.00971 -0.0590*** -0.0423*** 
  [0.0298] [0.0224] [0.0216] [0.0156] 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,719 24,742 11,893 25,238 
 
NOTES: Data from UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (1994-1997). The coefficients and standard errors 
(in parenthesis) are reported. *** represents significance at the 1% level, ** represents significance at the 
5% level and * represents significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 
replications. We include a full set of time dummies (each quarter of each year) in all the regressions. For 
definitions of variables, see Table 5. 
 
Table 8: Exclude WFTC Announcement and Implementation Periods 
  
  Men Women 
  Ln (Wages) 
  [1] [2] 
Predicted wage 0.983*** 1.012*** 
  [0.00565] [0.00411] 
WFTC -0.288*** -0.00859 
  [0.0479] [0.00936] 
FC Generosity  0.181* 0.00853 
  [0.106] [0.0312] 
Spillover (Industry) -0.173*** -0.101*** 
  [0.0544] [0.0152] 
Spillover (Education) -0.371*** -0.0433*** 
  [0.0598] [0.0142] 
Constant 0.336*** 0.231*** 
  [0.0156] [0.0107] 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 76,145 80,421 
 
NOTES: The coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. *** represents significance at 
the 1% level, ** represents significance at the 5% level and * represents significance at the 10% level. 
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 replications. We include a full set of time dummies (each quarter 
of each year) in all the regressions. For definitions of variables, see Table 5. 
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Table 9: Effect of WFTC by Firm Size 
 
  MEN WOMEN 
 Ln (Wages) 
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Predicted wage 0.870*** 1.001*** 1.050*** 0.980*** 1.030*** 1.023*** 
  [0.0118] [0.0122] [0.00747] [0.00828] [0.00864] [0.00580] 
WFTC -0.191*** -0.358*** -0.181 -0.0152 0.00896 0.0260 
  [0.0595] [0.114] [0.112] [0.0138] [0.0202] [0.0172] 
FC Generosity  -0.141 0.426* 0.146 0.0583 -0.0159 -0.0378 
  [0.159] [0.256] [0.191] [0.0483] [0.0659] [0.0532] 
Spillover (Industry) -0.406*** 0.136 0.387*** 0.109*** 0.0361 -0.215*** 
  [0.0901] [0.103] [0.0817] [0.0294] [0.0355] [0.0206] 
Spillover (Education) -0.519*** -0.0843 0.136* -0.0486* 0.0841*** -0.0282 
  [0.128] [0.130] [0.0759] [0.0276] [0.0313] [0.0196] 
Constant 0.487*** 0.163*** 0.180*** 0.192*** 0.0697*** 0.256*** 
  [0.0322] [0.0345] [0.0207] [0.0206] [0.0234] [0.0151] 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,064 13,256 45,866 23,115 16,615 40,739 
 
NOTES: The coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. *** represents significance at 
the 1% level, ** represents significance at the 5% level and * represents significance at the 10% level. 
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 replications. Small are firms with fewer than 25 workers. Medium 
are firms with 25 to 49 workers. Large are firms with more than 50 workers. We include a full set of time 
dummies (each quarter of each year) in all the regressions. For definitions of variables, see Table 5. 
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Figure 1: FC/WFTC Recipients by Family Type, May 1988 - November 2002 
 
Source: Working Families' Tax Credit Statistics, Inland Revenue Quarterly Enquiry (2003) 
     
 
 
Figure 2: Kernel Density of WFTC Effect on Wage for Men  
(Industry Comparison) 
 
 
Figure 2a     Figure 2b 
  NOTES: “Eligible” are workers eligible for WFTC. “Non-Eligible (“Similar”)” in Figure 2a are workers 
not eligible for WFTC in the Agriculture & Fishing, Energy & Water, and Construction industry categories, 
which have the highest density of WFTC-eligible workers. “Non-Eligible (“Non-Similar”)” in Figure 2b 
are workers not eligible for WFTC in the Manufacturing, Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants, and Public 
Admin, Education & Health (University education) categories, which have the lowest density of WFTC-
eligible workers. See Table 1a for % of WFTC-eligible workers by industry category. 
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Figure 3: Kernel Density of WFTC Effect on Wage for Men  
(Education Comparison) 
 
Figure 3a     Figure 3b 
 NOTES: “Eligible” are workers eligible for WFTC. “Non-Eligible (“Similar”)” in Figure 3a are workers 
not eligible for WFTC in the High School_16 education category, which has the highest density of WFTC-
eligible workers. “Non-Eligible (“Non-Similar”)” in Figure 3b are workers not eligible for WFTC in the 
University education category, which has the lowest density of WFTC-eligible workers. See Table 1b for 
% of WFTC-eligible workers by education category. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Kernel Density of WFTC Effect on Wage for Women 
(Industry Comparison) 
 
 
Figure 4a     Figure 4b 
 NOTES: “Eligible” are workers eligible for WFTC. “Non-Eligible (“Similar”)” in Figure 4a are workers 
not eligible for WFTC in the Agriculture & Fishing, Energy & Water, and Construction industry categories, 
which have the highest density of WFTC-eligible workers. “Non-Eligible (“Non-Similar”)” in Figure 4b 
are workers not eligible for WFTC in the Manufacturing, Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants, and Public 
Admin, Education & Health (University education) categories, which have the lowest density of WFTC-
eligible workers. See Table 1a for % of WFTC-eligible workers by industry category. 
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Figure 5: Kernel Density of WFTC Effect on Wage for Women  
(Education Comparison) 
 
 
Figure 5a     Figure 5b 
  NOTES: “Eligible” are workers eligible for WFTC. “Non-Eligible (“Similar”)” in Figure 5a are workers 
not eligible for WFTC in the High School_16 education category, which has the highest density of WFTC-
eligible workers. “Non-Eligible (“Non-Similar”)” in Figure 5b are workers not eligible for WFTC in the 
University education category, which has the lowest density of WFTC-eligible workers. See Table 1b for 
% of WFTC-eligible workers by education category. 
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